Iran’s economy in the 2010s, shaped by intensifying international sanctions, structural dependence on oil revenues, and weak planning institutions, experienced profound and multidimensional instability. These conditions significantly increased the vulnerability of the private sector, leading to disruptions in supply chains, declining investment, reduced productivity, and constraints on exports. In response, the government, acting as the social policy-making authority, introduced a series of supportive measures in areas such as financing, foreign trade, reducing production costs, improving the business environment, and strengthening economic governance.



The central question of this article is how the government’s social policies during the sanctions of the 2010s affected the reduction of sanction-related risks and the strengthening of Iran’s private sector. The article argues that the government’s social policies and actions aimed at supporting the private sector were largely ineffective. Structural characteristics of the state-dominated economy, severe financial constraints, weaknesses in management and policymaking, and the intensity of sanction mechanisms prevented these policies from fulfilling their guiding, participatory, and catalytic roles. As a result, they failed to facilitate the reduction of private sector vulnerability or enhance its position within Iran’s economic structure.



Consequently, most implemented policies remained temporary, reactive, and non-structural, offering limited contribution to long-term resilience or sustainable development in the private sector. By examining these trends, the article provides a critical assessment of the effectiveness of the government’s social policymaking during the sanction period